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Following its devaluation of the peso on 
December 20, 1994, the Mexican government 
experienced increasing difficulties in selling its 
dollar-indexed bonds, tesobonos, at weekly auc-
tions, up until the point that a default seemed 
inevitable. On January 30, 1995, US President 
Bill Clinton organized a 48.8 billion USD loan 
package for Mexico with funds from the US 
Exchange Stabilization Fund, the International 
Monetary Fund, the Bank for International 
Settlements, and the Bank of Canada. The 
Clinton bailout of Mexico required the govern-
ment to pay penalty interest rates on borrowing 
from this package and to pledge its oil export 
revenues as collateral. During 1995 and 1996, 
the Mexican government reduced spending and 
increased taxes. The government borrowed less 
than half of the loans offered, and, as it regained 
access to credit markets, paid back these loans 
by January 1997, three years ahead of schedule.
The Clinton bailout of Mexico suggests 
that, by following Bagehot’s (1873) dictum of 
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 lending freely at a penalty interest rate and on 
good collateral, an outside party can put an 
end to a sovereign debt crisis. Starting in 2008, 
the governments of a number of countries in 
the eurozone—notably the PIIGS: Portugal, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain—have had 
to pay high spreads over German yields on 
sales of sovereign bonds, as seen in Figure 1. 
So far, only Greece has defaulted on its debt. 
We ask whether the Troika—the European 
Commission, the European Central Bank, and 
the International Monetary Fund—can bail 
out the troubled countries in the eurozone as 
President Clinton bailed out Mexico in 1995. 
Our analysis suggests that debt levels among 
the PIIGS are so high that it may be too late for 
such bailouts to be successful in inducing these 
countries to reduce their debt.
I. Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises
Our paper builds on the analysis of the debt 
crises in the eurozone of Conesa and Kehoe (2012), which in turn builds on the analysis 
of the Mexican debt crisis of Cole and Kehoe (1996, 2000).
Conesa and Kehoe’s (2012) model has three 
sets of actors—domestic households, interna-
tional lenders, and the domestic government. 
The government chooses government spending 
and borrowing and whether or not to default to 
maximize the expected discounted utility of the 
households. The state of the economy in every 
period, s = (B,  z −1 , ζ), is the level of govern-
ment debt B, whether or not default has occurred 
in the past  z −1 , and the value of the sunspot vari-
able ζ. The country’s GDP is
(1) y(z) =  Z 1−z  _ y,
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where 1 > Z > 0 and 1 − Z is the default 
penalty. To keep the model simple, we assume 
that this penalty is permanent. The government 
solves the dynamic programming problem
(2)   V(s) = max u(c, g) + β V(s′ )
 s.t. c = (1 − θ)y(z)
 g + zB = θy(z) + q(B′, s)B′
 z = 0 if  z −1 = 0.
Here u(c, g) is the households’ concave utility 
function, which depends on private consumption 
c and government spending g. The government 
is benevolent in that shares the same utility func-
tion as households. All actors in the model have 
the same discount factor β. To keep the model 
simple, we assume that the tax rate θ is constant 
and that there is no private investment.
Lenders are risk neutral and have deep pock-
ets. In particular, they buy the bonds B′ offered 
for a price q(B′, s) that implies the same expected 
yield 1/β − 1 as risk-free bonds:
(3)  q(B′, s) = βEz(B′(s′ ), s′, q(B′(s′ ), s′ )).
Let π be the probability that the sunspot variable ζ takes on a value that tells the international lend-
ers to panic if a crisis would be  self-fulfilling. 
Then,
(4) q(B′, s) = β(1 − π)
if the amount borrowed B′ leaves the govern-
ment at the risk of a self-fulfilling debt crisis in 
the next period. That is, z(B′(s′ ), s′, q(B′(s′ ), s′ )) = (1 − π) is the probability that the govern-
ment will repay the debt in the next period.
The possibility of self-fulfilling crises in the 
Cole-Kehoe and Conesa-Kehoe models depends 
on the timing of sovereign debt auctions and 
government decisions to default or not: the sun-
spot occurs first, then the government offers new 
bonds B′ at auction, which the bankers buy at 
price q(B′, s), and then the government decides 
whether to default or not. The equilibrium out-
come is that, if there is an unfavorable realiza-
tion of the sunspot variable—some bad news 
that is irrelevant except for its impact on the 
equilibrium—lenders will not lend to the gov-
ernment if they know that this lack of lending 
will, in fact, cause the government to default. 
If, however, the realization of the sunspot vari-
able is favorable, the lenders lend and no crisis 
occurs. In this sense, the crisis is self-fulfilling.
Two cutoff levels of debt are endogenous 
in the solution to the government’s problem: 
a lower cutoff  
_ b and an upper cutoff  _ B(q). If 
B ≤  _ b, the government repays even if lend-
ers do not lend. If, however,  
_ b < B ≤  _ B(q), 
the government repays if bankers lend at price 
q. The government defaults whether or not lend-
ers lend if B >  _ B(q). The crisis zone is the set 
of debt levels for which  
_ b < B ≤  _ B(β(1 − π)). 
For sufficiently low debt levels, B ≤  _ b, no 
 self-fulfilling crisis is possible. For high enough 
debt levels, B >  _ B(β(1 − π)), no borrowing 
is possible. For debt levels in between these 
 cutoffs, whether or not a crisis occurs depends 
on the realization of the sunspot variable. There 
are multiple equilibria in the model that depend 
on the probability π of an unfavorable realiza-
tion of this sunspot variable. In fact, Conesa and 
Kehoe (2012) show that π itself can fluctuate 
over time, following a Markov process. The arbi-
trary nature of π—the arbitrary nature of exactly 
what constitutes bad news in the model—is how 
the model captures what finance ministers refer 
to when they complain about their country’s 
sovereign bonds being at the mercy of the finan-
cial markets.
In the Cole-Kehoe model, the optimal policy 
for a government when its debt is in the crisis 
zone is, in general, to run surpluses to reduce the 
debt to the safe level  
_ b  —although, if the debt is 
sufficiently high and if π is sufficiently low, it 
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Figure 1. Yields on 10-year Sovereign Bonds in the 
Eurozone
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can be optimal for the government to keep debt 
constant. Unless the debt is sufficiently close 
to the safe level  
_ b, it is optimal to reduce the 
debt in a number of steps because the concavity 
of u(c,g) implies that the government wants to 
smooth its spending.
II. Gambling for Redemption
Since 2008, the governments of the PIIGS 
have run deficits and increased their levels 
of debt, as seen in Figure 2, even though they 
have faced high spreads on bond sales, which 
we interpret as having levels of debt in the cri-
sis zone. To rationalize this behavior—which 
cannot be optimal in the Cole-Kehoe model—
Conesa and Kehoe (2012) introduce recessions 
into the model. A government of a country that 
is in a recession has the incentive to borrow to 
smooth government spending, even though this 
borrowing puts the country at greater risk of a 
self-fulfilling crisis. We refer to this policy of 
borrowing as gambling for redemption.
The state of an economy in every period is 
now s = (B, a,  z −1 , ζ), where a = 1 when the 
country is in normal times and a = 0 when it is 
in a recession. The country’s GDP is now
(5) y(a, z) =  A 1−a  Z 1−z  _ y,
where 1 > A > 0 and 1 − A is the severity of 
the recession. Let p be the probability that a 
increases from 0 to 1. In other words, a country 
in a recession has a low level of GDP A 
_ y and 
faces a probability p of recovery to the high level 
of GDP  
_ y in the next period. To keep the model 
simple, we assume that, after a recovery from 
a recession, the country never enters another 
recession.
There are now four cutoffs:  
_ b(y) and  _ B(y, q), 
where y =  _ y or y = A _ y and q = β(1 − π). The 
government faces a schedule of bond prices that 
depend on whether or not the country is in a 
recession and how much new debt B′ it wants to 
sell at auction. As the government tries to auc-
tion off more new debt, the price it receives falls 
as this debt B′ crosses cutoffs, as in Figure 3.
Consider the case in which
(6)   _ b(A _ y) <  _ b( _ y) <  _ B(A _ y, β(1 − π))
 <  _ B( _ y, β(1 − π)),
which holds for reasonable values of the 
parameters. (If the recession is very severe, 
that is, 1 − A is very large, it is possible that 
 
_ B(A _ y,β(1 − π)) ≤  _ b( _ y).) Suppose that the 
country is in a recession. For low enough debt 
offerings, B′ ≤  _ b(A _ y), the price is β; as B′ 
crosses  
_ b(A _ y), the price falls to β(p + (1 − p)
(1 − π)); and, as B′ crosses  _ b( _ y), the price 
falls to β(1 − π). There is even the interest-
ing possibility that the government will choose 
to sell debt at price β p(1 − π) when it is in 
a recession, where  
_ B(A _ y, β(1 − π)) < B′ 
≤  _ B( _ y, β(1 − π)); that is, it will sell so much 
debt that lenders know that the government will 
repay only if the country recovers and no crisis 
occurs.
To understand this price schedule, sup-
pose, for example, that the government offers 
Figure 3. Bond Prices
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_ b(A _ y) < B′ ≤  _ b( _ y) at auction. If the realization 
of the sunspot variable in the current period is 
favorable, then lenders will pay
(7) q(B′, s) = β(p + (1 − p)(1 − π))
for the bonds: they know that the government 
will repay for sure if the country recovers, which 
occurs with probability p, and it will also repay 
even if the country is still in a recession, which 
occurs with probability 1 − p, as long as there is 
no crisis, which occurs with probability 1 − π. 
That is, ( p + (1 − p)(1 − π)) is the probabil-
ity that the government will repay B′.
When debt is in the crisis zone during a reces-
sion, the government has conflicting incentives. 
It can reduce its debt to escape the crisis zone 
so as to reduce the interest that it pays on its 
debt and eliminate the possibility of incurring 
the default penalty or it can increase its debt 
to smooth spending and gamble for redemp-
tion. Conesa and Kehoe (2012) find that the 
optimal government policy depends on the 
parameters of the model. In particular, the gov-
ernment runs down the debt if interest rates are 
high (π is large), the costs of default are high (1 − Z is large), the recession is mild (1 − A 
is small), and the probability of recovery is low ( p is small). On the other hand, in the crisis 
zone, the government runs up the debt if interest 
rates are low, the costs of default are low, the 
recession is severe, and the probability of recov-
ery is high. Furthermore, even for parameter 
values for which a government chooses to run 
down its debt if the initial debt is low enough, it 
can gamble for redemption and run up the debt if 
the initial debt is high enough. For high enough 
levels of initial debt, it is simply too costly to 
cut spending over a long period of time to try to 
reach the safe zone of debt.
III. Bailouts and the Role of Collateral
We now introduce a fourth actor, the Troika, 
into the model. Suppose that, with probability π b , the Troika bails out the government in the 
event of a debt crisis. With probability  π d , the 
government is forced to default,  π b +  π d = 1. 
The country’s GDP is now
(8) y(a,  z b ,  z d ) =  A 1−a  Z b 1− z b   Z d 1− z d   _ y,
where 1 >  Z b >  Z d > 0. That is, the cost of a 
bailout, 1 −  Z b , is less than the cost of a default, 
1 −  Z d . To simplify the analysis, we assume 
that there is either a bailout or a default, but not 
both, in the event of a self-fulfilling crisis. What 
is currently going on in Greece does not easily 
fit into our model.
The Troika buys the government bonds dur-
ing the bailout at price  q b ≤ β. In the event 
of a bailout, the relevant cutoffs are  
_ b(A Z b _ y) 
for the upper limit of the safe zone during the 
recession and  
_ b( Z b _ y) during normal times and 
 
_ Bb (A Z b _ y,  q b ) for the upper limit of the crisis 
zone during the recession and  
_ Bb ( Z b _ y,  q b ) dur-
ing normal times. If the government runs down 
its debt to reach  
_ b(A Z b _ y) during the recession 
or  
_ b( Z b _ y) during normal times, the govern-
ment can resume sales of bonds to international 
lenders at price q = β. Once there is a bailout, 
a  self-fulfilling crisis cannot occur. In other 
words, the spread 1/ q b − 1/β is a penalty, not 
a risk premium.
Our question is whether, in the event of a self-
fulfilling crisis, the Troika can bail out the gov-
ernment and impose a high enough interest rate 
on its lending, a low enough price  q b , to induce 
the government to run surpluses and reduce its 
debt to  
_ b(A Z b _ y) even if the recession persists. 
If the debt level B is high enough, because the 
government has been gambling for redemption 
and gambling for a bailout, the answer is no: a 
low price  q b for bonds lowers the upper limit of 
the crisis zone  
_ Bb (A Z b _ y,  q b ) so much that
(9) B >  _ Bb (A Z b _ y,  q b ),
and the government prefers to default. Notice 
that, to compute  
_ Bb (A Z b _ y,  q b ), we need to imag-
ine the government choosing to default and 
incurring the full default penalty 1 −  Z d even 
though a bailout has occurred.
It is possible to increase the upper limit of the 
crisis zone by imposing collateral on borrowing 
during the bailout. The crucial question is: What 
happens if the government defaults even after it 
has been bailed out? The specification that we 
have discussed assumes that GDP drops from 
A Z b  _ y to A Z d  _ y. Collateral increases the penalty 
for a default, lowering GDP even further, say, 
to A Z g  Z b  _ y. Collateral serves as a commitment 
device for the government, allowing it to sell 
more debt. If its debt is high enough, however, 
a collateral requirement as part of a bailout is 
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unattractive for the government because it com-
mits the government to do something that it pre-
fers not to do—pay a high interest rate on this 
debt.
IV. Numerical Experiments
We modify the numerical experiment in 
Conesa and Kehoe (2012) to provide some illus-
trations of the sorts of results that the model pro-
duces. A period is one year, and we model bonds 
having an average maturity of six years using 
the specification of Chatterjee and Eyigungor (2012):
(10) q(B′, s) = βE [ z(B′(s′ ), s′, q(B′(s′ ), s′ ))
 ×  ( δ  +  (1 − δ)q(B′(s′ ), s′ ) ) ] ;
that is, a fraction of bonds δ = 0.17 needs to 
be paid every period. Fortunately, this change 
in the model does not change our basic analysis 
but makes it possible for the model to produce 
reasonable results in numerical experiments.
We assume that GDP in normal times is _ y = 100. During the recession, GDP falls to 
A 
_ y = 90. The bailout penalty is 5 percent of 
GDP,  Z b = 0.95, while the default penalty is 
10 percent,  Z d = 0.90. The utility function is
(11) u(c, g) = log(c) + γ log(g −  _ g),
where γ = 0.25 and  _ g = 25. The parameter  _ g
dictates how much government spending the 
households and government regard as essen-
tial; the results are sensitive to changes in this 
parameter. The discount factor is β = 0.96. The 
government collects 40 percent of GDP in taxes, θ = 0.40. The probability of recovery from 
the recession is p = 0.20, so that the expected 
duration of a recession is five years, 1/p. The 
probability of an unfavorable realization of the 
sunspot variable is π = 0.03, which implies a 
spread of about 3 percent. The households and 
the government assume that, if there is a crisis, 
the Troika will provide a bailout with probabil-
ity  π b = 0.50.
Suppose that  q b = 0.90. Before the reces-
sion, that is, before 2008, the crisis zone is 
 
_ b(100) = 90.0 < B ≤  _ B(100,0.931) = 173.9. 
Here, of course, β(1 − π) = 0.931. Then 
the recession hits unexpectedly in 2008 and 
the crisis zone drops to  
_ b(90) = 66.0 < B ≤  _ B(90,0.931) = 161.4. Notice that, in this 
crisis zone, the price of bonds is β( p + (1 − p) × (1 − π)) = 0.936 if B′ ≤  _ b(100) and it is β(1 − π) = 0.931 if B′ >  _ b(100). The gov- 
ernment defaults or is bailed out if 
161.0 < B ≤ 173.9. The government starts 
to run down its debt if 66.0 < B ≤ 84.3 
or 90.0 < B ≤ 117.1. For debt lev-
els 0 ≤ B < 66.0, 84.3 < B < 90.0, and 
126.8 < B < 161.4, it gambles for redemption. 
For debt levels B = 66.0, B = 90.0, B = 161.0, 
and 117.1 ≤ B ≤ 126.8, it keeps debt constant.
Suppose a crisis occurs and the Troika bails 
out the country, setting the price  q b = 0.90 for 
bonds. Notice that this implies a substantial pen-
alty over the interest rate where q = β = 0.96, 
and still implies a penalty over the interest rate 
where q = β(1 − π) = 0.931 or the interest rate 
where q = β(p + (1 − p)(1 − π)) = 0.936. 
As a consequence, the government runs down 
the debt if it does not default and debt is in 
the crisis zone. The problem is that the upper 
debt limit  
_ Bb (85.5, 0.90) comes crashing down 
to 83.4, and the government would prefer to 
default rather than to make the interest payments 
dictated by the bailout.
Imposing a collateral requirement as part 
of this bailout changes the numbers. In par-
ticular, the upper debt limit during a recession 
becomes  
_ B(90, 0.931) = 154.4. If there is a 
crisis and a bailout, the upper limit only drops 
to  
_ Bb (85.5, 0.90) = 117.8. Now the problem is 
that the government runs down the debt only if 
B < 86.2. The government gambles for redemp-
tion and runs up its debt if B > 102.9. That is, 
the price  q b = 0.90 for new bonds sold is not 
low enough to induce the government to run 
down its debt.
Our experiments indicate that we need very 
large penalty interest rates to induce the gov-
ernment to run down its debt after a bailout, 
interest rates that correspond to bond prices like 
q b = 0.85. The problem with such high interest 
rates is that they would make a bailout unat-
tractive for the government. If the Troika can-
not force the government to accept the collateral 
requirement when  q b = 0.85, then the gov-
ernment would prefer to default rather than to 
accept a bailout with the collateral requirement 
if B > 79.6 when the country is in a recession 
and if B > 101.0 if the country has recovered.
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V. How Can the Eurozone Debt Crises End?
Our model is simplistic along many dimen-
sions and includes simplifying assumptions 
that are worth relaxing. Nonetheless, using the 
model as a lens through which to compare the 
1994 –1995 Mexican crisis with the ongoing 
threat of crises in the eurozone suggests that 
there are four ways that the ongoing problems 
in each of these eurozone countries can end: 
First, and most obviously, vigorous economic 
growth in the country could resume. Second, the 
government could default and the country could 
leave the eurozone. This would allow the coun-
try to devalue its real exchange rate and perhaps 
induce the sort of growth that Mexico experi-
enced after its crisis. Third, the Troika could take 
over the public finances of the country and force 
the government to run down the debt, ignoring 
the incentives to gamble for redemption and 
gamble for a bailout. Forcing the government to 
accept a bailout with a high penalty interest rate 
and a large collateral requirement would be an 
obvious way to do this. Fourth, the government 
and households of the country, in their role as 
voters, could realize that they are significantly 
poorer than they thought that they would be dur-
ing the 2000–2008 boom, eliminating much of 
the incentive to gamble for redemption.
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